The Religious Lobby: How Egypt’s Influence Network Turns Nominal Progress Into a False Narrative
By Coptic Solidarity –
The first two articles in Coptic Solidarity’s Egyptian Influence series examined Egypt’s conventional lobbying operation— Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Ed Royce, and the Friends of Egypt Caucus—and how that access intersects with Congressional gatekeepers. This third article looks at a less obvious channel: religious, nonprofit, and development networks that can carry the same message with different forms of credibility.
On May 1, 2025, Rev. Dr. Andrea Zaki, the President of the Evangelical Community in Egypt, and an Egyptian delegation met Patrick Harvey, then acting U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom.
According to Zaki’s own federal disclosure (FARA), the delegation presented what it called the “positive developments” in religious freedom under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It described Egypt’s progress as a “model transformation” and pointed to the proposed personal-status law for Christians and the law governing church construction as significant advances.[1]
But this was not simply a Christian Evangelical leader offering his personal assessment of conditions in Egypt. The delegation brought together representatives of the Egyptian government, Parliament, the government-appointed National Council for Human Rights, state-linked media, Egyptian and American religious organizations, and the U.S. nonprofit Hands Along the Nile Development Services.
Together, they carried substantially the same message into meetings with members of Congress, State Department officials, the United Nations, an influential think tank, American church leaders, and the official responsible for evaluating religious freedom around the world.
This is how Egypt’s religious influence network operates. Each participant contributes a distinct form of authority: government officials provide official assurances; parliamentarians and national human-rights figures confer institutional legitimacy; state-linked media amplify the message; Egyptian Christian leaders provide religious validation; American nonprofits and churches provide trusted domestic platforms; and professional lobbyists obtain access and place the same narrative before policymakers and the public.
The result can look like independent corroboration. In reality, the same selective account of Egypt’s progress is moving through an interconnected network.
A religious leader registered to influence American policy
Andrea Zaki is president of the Protestant Churches of Egypt and president of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services, commonly known as CEOSS.[2] He is also an individual registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. His registration, No. 7124, identifies the Protestant Churches of Egypt as his disclosed foreign principal.[3]
In that filing, Zaki said he meets members of Congress and State Department officials to explain conditions in Egypt, especially the situation of Christians, Muslim-Christian relations, and civil society. He answered “Yes” when asked whether his work would include political activity; the FARA form asks registrants to describe such activity under categories that include “lobbying, promotion, perception management, public relations,” “economic development,” and the dissemination of informational materials. His subsequent filings classify meetings with U.S. officials, members of Congress, religious organizations, and HANDS as political activities conducted for the Protestant Churches of Egypt.[3]
That classification is important. Zaki’s U.S. engagements are not limited to pastoral visits or church fellowship. His filings describe an organized effort to influence American understanding of Egyptian affairs, including religious freedom, bilateral relations, investment, development assistance, regional security, and Egypt’s international image.
In March 2023, for example, Zaki distributed an Egyptian government investment link to American religious leaders and HANDS Executive Director Jennifer Cate “to encourage to invest in Egypt.”[4] During a May 2023 visit, he reported meetings with members of Congress, State Department officials, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. His talking points included alleged progress on religious freedom, civil society, women’s empowerment, anti-torture measures, and economic reform.[5]
The most extensive disclosed campaign occurred from April 29 to May 2, 2025.
A coordinated advocacy campaign
The composition of Zaki’s 2025 delegation reveals how the different parts of the network reinforce one another. The group included Tarek Radwan, chairman of the Egyptian Parliament’s Human Rights Committee; Mahmoud Karem and Samira Luka of the National Council for Human Rights; Ayman Abu Omar of the Ministry of (Islamic) Endowments; Ezzat Ibrahim of Al-Ahram Weekly and Ahram Online; HANDS Executive Director Jennifer Cate; Global Ministries representative Peter Makari; and Zaki himself.[1]
The delegation held a roundtable at the United Nations with officials from the UN Alliance of Civilizations and the head of the United Church of Christ. It met Representatives Anna Paulina Luna, Kevin Hern, George Latimer, and Chuck Edwards, as well as Senator James Lankford. It had breakfast at the residence of Egyptian Ambassador Motaz Zahran. It met Faris Asad, director of the State Department’s Office of North African Affairs; Council on Foreign Relations fellow Steven Cook; and Acting Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Patrick Harvey.
The discussions addressed religious freedom, human rights, national dialogue, regional stability, investment, economic reconstruction, and what the filing called the “stability of Christians in Egypt.”
At one meeting, the delegation reportedly explained what it depicted as human-rights reforms Egypt had implemented. At another, it discussed “positive developments” in religious freedom and the proposed personal-status law for Copts. With the acting religious-freedom ambassador, it characterized Egypt’s progress as a “model transformation.”
These were not incidental conversations. Zaki disclosed the activities to the Justice Department as political work for the Protestant Churches of Egypt.[1]
Global Ministries describes the broader Egyptian-U.S. Dialogue Initiative as a collaboration between CEOSS, American churches, and ecumenical organizations. Its partners have included the United Church of Christ, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church (USA), National Council of Churches, and Churches for Middle East Peace. The initiative had held seven encounters by 2025.[6]
Policymakers were receiving a favorable assessment of Egypt through participants carrying governmental, parliamentary, human-rights, media, religious, and nonprofit credentials. What can appear to be confirmation from several sectors was, in this instance, being advanced by the same delegation.
From conventional lobbying to religious validation
The message carried by Zaki’s delegation closely resembles the message promoted through Egypt’s conventional lobbying operation.
On May 28, 2026, The Washington Times published an opinion article by (now former) Egyptian Ambassador Motaz Zahran titled “Egypt’s Religious Freedom Tradition an Asset to America, the World.” Its subtitle declared that Sisi “walks the walk on tolerance for all faiths.”
The article portrayed Egypt and the United States as countries with a shared commitment to religious diversity. It cited Sisi’s Christmas appearances, the construction of the Cathedral of the Nativity, the legalization of church buildings, restoration of Jewish sites, and the still-unfinished personal-status law for Christians. It concluded that Egypt was becoming a regional model for religious freedom.
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Egypt’s registered lobbying firm, subsequently filed the article with the Justice Department as informational material disseminated for Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[7]
The similarity is striking.
Zaki’s religious delegation described Egypt as a “model transformation.” Egypt’s ambassador described it as a “regional role model.” Both relied on substantially the same selective evidence: presidential gestures toward Christians, legalization of existing church buildings, the proposed personal-status law, high-profile state religious projects, and official claims of coexistence.
The professional lobbyist and the Christian leader serve different functions. Brownstein places the foreign government’s case before officials and the American public. Zaki and his religious partners give substantially the same argument a Christian, humanitarian, and civil-society voice.
One message arrives as foreign-government advocacy. The other may be received as testimony from Christian leaders describing the experiences of their own community. That distinction makes the religious channel especially valuable.
American delegations and the curated experience of Egypt
The influence also moves in the other direction. American religious leaders are brought to Egypt, given high-level access, and introduced to the country through officials and religious institutions that emphasize national unity, tolerance, stability, and the fight against extremism.
On September 10, 2017, Zaki accompanied a high-level delegation of American church leaders to meet Egypt’s Grand Mufti Shawki Allam. The government religious institution told the visitors that Egyptian society represented a model of national unity and resistance to sectarianism. The mufti also briefed them on the state’s efforts to combat extremism and terrorism.[8]
Less than two months later, Zaki joined Sisi and Egyptian intelligence chief Khalid Fawzi for a three-hour meeting with what participants described as the first delegation of American evangelical leaders received by the president.
The visit originated with Sisi himself. During an earlier meeting in Washington, he invited American author and Evangelical leader Joel Rosenberg to bring a delegation to Cairo. Rosenberg later wrote that he and the other participants came to build a long-term friendship with Sisi and Egypt’s leadership.
His account praised Sisi for fighting Islamist terrorism, protecting Christians, rebuilding churches, stabilizing Egypt, and repairing the U.S.-Egyptian alliance. The Egyptian presidency’s accompanying statement emphasized citizenship, equality, religious diversity, and non-discrimination. The American delegation, in turn, praised Egypt as a cornerstone of regional stability and moderation.[9]
The same pattern has continued.
In December 2023, Zaki and leaders of the Evangelical Synod of the Nile received a senior delegation from the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in the United States.[10] In September 2024, he participated in meetings between Egypt’s minister of Islamic endowments, Pope Tawadros II, a delegation from the South African Council of Churches, and representatives of American churches.[11][12]
In May 2025, Zaki received Presbyterian evangelical leaders from California at CEOSS. He presented CEOSS’s development, education, health care, economic-empowerment, dialogue, and peacebuilding programs. The visitors praised the organization as an inspiring model combining spiritual mission, development, citizenship, and human dignity.[13]
These delegations do not merely hear claims about Egypt from a distance. They experience hospitality, personal relationships, development projects, religious meetings, and unusually senior government access. The resulting impressions can then return to the United States as eyewitness testimony from respected American Christian leaders.
But the experience is structured. The visitors principally encounter Egypt through the institutions, projects, officials, and religious figures selected to receive them.
The network also reaches directly into America’s religious-freedom establishment: Zaki met the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom in 2023, and his 2025 delegation presented its “model transformation” narrative directly to Acting Ambassador Patrick Harvey.
This brought the network’s message directly to the office charged with evaluating whether foreign governments protect or violate religious freedom.
The significance is not simply that Zaki obtained a meeting. It is what the delegation placed before the official: a coordinated presentation in which Egyptian government, parliamentary, national human-rights, media, religious, and nonprofit representatives collectively described the government’s policies as evidence of major reform.
HANDS: A nonprofit bridge
Hands Along the Nile provides much of the institutional infrastructure connecting development, religious engagement, public diplomacy, and American audiences.
HANDS describes itself as an Egyptian-American nonprofit building bridges between the two countries. Its work includes development projects, professional exchanges, educational programs, American visits to Egypt, and the Egyptian-American dialogue.[14]
Its earlier annual reports are particularly revealing about the intended function of these programs. HANDS described its “Track Two Diplomacy” as bringing together “non-official but influential” people from the two countries. Its Egyptian-American dialogue convened participants from the media, academia, civil society, and religious leadership. Its “Insight Trips” brought Americans to Egypt for historical visits, encounters with Egyptians, meals in private homes, and tours of projects supported by the organization.
In 2009 alone, HANDS coordinated three such trips. Its report explained that direct exposure could challenge existing perceptions of Egypt and the Middle East.[15] The Egyptian Embassy later described the organization’s public-diplomacy function even more explicitly. On March 9, 2021, Ambassador Motaz Zahran participated in a virtual HANDS event addressing its community work and “ways of promoting Egypt’s success stories in the United States.”[16]
Zaki sits on the HANDS board. His FARA filings show that he attended a board meeting in Washington on October 17, 2025, followed by another in New York on June 12, 2026. The meetings concerned development projects in Egypt. Zaki reported both as activities for the Protestant Churches of Egypt, and his latest filing classified the 2026 HANDS meeting as political activity.[17][18] HANDS therefore does more than finance charitable projects.
Its own records describe an organization connecting influential people, shaping
perceptions, hosting exchanges, introducing Americans to selected Egyptian
institutions, and promoting Egyptian success stories in the United States.
Religious exchange, charitable development, and registered advocacy are not improper. However, HANDS becomes relevant because it operates across several overlapping networks that can carry the same selective account of Egypt’s religious-freedom record to American audiences and policymakers.
How selective progress becomes a false narrative
The Egyptian government has taken some steps concerning Christian institutions. Thousands of existing, previously unlicensed churches and service buildings have been approved for preliminary legalization; in April 2026, the government said the total had reached 3,804.[20] Sisi shows up for a few minutes at Coptic Christmas celebrations. The state constructed a prominent cathedral in its new administrative capital, but it was fully financed by Coptic-owned businesses.
The government has also highlighted religious-heritage projects, including efforts to revive the Holy Family Trail, which USCIRF noted in both its 2025 and 2026 reporting. Earlier USCIRF reporting identified sites associated with that effort, including MuharraqMonastery in al-Qusiya and the Monastery of the Virgin Mary in Durunka, and also documented the restoration of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo and Eliyahu Hanavi Synagogue in Alexandria.[21]
These initiatives are worthwhile in their own right. But restoring religious monuments, legalizing existing church buildings, and making symbolic gestures toward Christians are not the same as guaranteeing equal religious freedom. They coexist with a separate legal regime governing Christian places of worship and with a much broader system of religious inequality.[21][25][26]
These facts provide the raw material for the narrative. The distortion occurs when visible, often superficial, gestures and limited administrative measures are treated as proof of equal citizenship and comprehensive religious reform.
Consider the personal-status law for Christians. Zaki’s delegation presented the proposed law to American officials as evidence of progress in May 2025. Yet the draft did not reach the Egyptian Parliament that year.
The Cabinet approved a new draft for Egyptian Christians in April 2026, and the government referred it to Parliament in May.[14][15] An August 2026 UK government country note stated that Parliament was still debating the draft as of July and that no further information on its progress or implementation had been located.[16]
Even that description understates the uncertainty surrounding the proposal. The draft itself remains controversial, and its full text has not been publicly available for comprehensive examination by all interested parties. Questions therefore remain not only about whether and when the law will be enacted, but also about whether its final provisions would actually remedy existing discrimination or introduce new problems.
Yet before those questions had been resolved—and before the law had even been enacted—the proposal was already being presented abroad as evidence of religious-freedom progress.
A proposed and still-contested law cannot reasonably be treated as an accomplished reform.
These issues of the personal status law and church construction represent only a small part of the larger citizenship problem.
Even if Egypt enacted an acceptable Christian personal-status law and replaced the discriminatory church-construction regime, Copts and other religious minorities would still not enjoy equal citizenship.
Religious identity remains embedded throughout Egyptian law and administration. Administrative practices effectively prevent Muslims who adopt another faith from officially changing their religious affiliation. Religious identity remains recorded in official documentation and affects areas of civil life. Blasphemy and related laws criminalize forms of religious expression. Non-Muslims remain severely underrepresented in judicial, administrative, military, security, and executive positions. Sunni religious institutions have expanded their influence across education, public administration, and public policy. And more than a decade after Egypt’s Constitution required an independent anti-discrimination commission, that institution still has not been established.[16][18][19]
These structural inequalities are compounded by the daily realities facing Copts: church closures and restrictions, sectarian and mob violence, coercive reconciliation practices, discriminatory treatment within state institutions, obstacles involving religious identity and conversion, unequal access to positions of authority, and prosecutions under blasphemy and related speech laws.[16][18][19]
Coptic Solidarity’s 2026 report Erosion of Citizenship in Egypt describes the larger trajectory as a widening divide between constitutional guarantees of equality and a system of state-managed religious governance in which religious identity increasingly shapes legal rights, public participation, education, and access to state authority.[19]
USCIRF has reached similarly troubling conclusions. Its reporting has documented sectarian attacks and persistent discrimination despite the government’s highly visible overtures toward Christian institutions.[13] Its 2026 Egypt update concluded that Egyptian authorities continued systematically enforcing laws, policies, and judicial decisions that repress non-Muslim religious life.[18]
The “model transformation” story does not have to deny every individual abuse. It works by shifting the criteria by which Egypt is judged.
A cathedral and legalization of some existing churches substitute for genuine freedom to build, repair, and operate places of worship. Presidential Christmas appearance substitutes for equal citizenship.
Foreign-financed development achievements are presented as proof of civic progress while independent civil society remains constrained.
A proposed law substitutes for scrutiny of legal and institutional discrimination and reform of the broader system of religiously unequal law.
The testimony of prominent Christian leaders presenting the government’s narrative substitutes for the voices of Christians who report discrimination or persecution.
Each selected fact may have some elements of truth. The conclusion assembled from them is false.
An echo chamber presented as independent confirmation
Washington is not hearing Egypt’s case from a single source. It hears it from an ambassador writing in an American newspaper; from Egyptian parliamentarians and government-appointed human-rights officials; from a former congressional chairman working through a registered lobbying firm; and from a Christian leader registered under FARA. It also hears it through a U.S. nonprofit, American church partners, visiting delegations, interfaith events, and development programs.
Because these voices occupy different institutional roles, their statements can appear to confirm one another. But the public record shows that many of the participants travel together, participate in the same dialogue initiatives, sit on the same boards, meet the same officials, and repeatedly invoke the same examples to support substantially the same conclusions.
This is the power of Egypt’s religious influence network. It does not merely deny abuses. It surrounds American policymakers with a more reassuring interpretation of them—one repeated by enough different kinds of messengers that coordinated narrative begins to look like consensus.
The effect is to obscure independent religious-freedom reporting that documents a reality the ‘model transformation’ narrative cannot explain: discrimination is legally established, and prevails through policies and practices, sectarian attacks continue, promised reforms remain unfinished, and Coptic appeals for equal citizenship still struggle to receive the same access and institutional reinforcement.
Egypt’s influence campaign relies on presenting selective nominal changes as the dominant frame through which all other evidence is interpreted.
——
Sources and Endnotes
[1] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Supplemental Statement, Andrea Zaki / Protestant Churches of Egypt, July 3, 2025. Records the April 29–May 2, 2025, delegation, participants, meetings, and political activities, including the discussion of religious freedom as a “model transformation.”DOJ FARA — Andrea Zaki Supplemental Statement, July 3, 2025 [2] Protestant Churches of Egypt, profile of Rev. Dr. Andrea Zaki. Identifies Zaki as president of the Protestant Churches of Egypt and president of CEOSS.
Protestant Churches of Egypt — Andrea Zaki profile [3] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Exhibit A-B, Andrea Zaki / Protestant Churches of Egypt, July 10, 2023. Identifies the Protestant Churches of Egypt as Zaki’s foreign principal and describes the nature of his U.S. activities.
DOJ FARA — Andrea Zaki Exhibit A-B, July 10, 2023 [4] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Informational Materials, Andrea Zaki, March 21, 2023. Contains the investment-related communication distributed to U.S. religious contacts and HANDS leadership.
DOJ FARA — Andrea Zaki Informational Materials, March 21, 2023 [5] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Supplemental Statement, Andrea Zaki, July 10, 2023. Reports meetings with members of Congress, State Department officials, religious-freedom officials, and other U.S. institutions.
DOJ FARA — Andrea Zaki Supplemental Statement, July 10, 2023 [6] Global Ministries, “Egyptian-U.S. Dialogue Initiative.” Describes the CEOSS-led dialogue initiative and its American church and ecumenical partners.
Global Ministries — Egyptian-U.S. Dialogue Initiative [7] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Informational Materials, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck / Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 3, 2026. FARA filing of former Ambassador Motaz Zahran’s May 28, 2026 Washington Times op-ed promoting Egypt’s religious-freedom record.
DOJ FARA — Brownstein Informational Materials, June 3, 2026 [8] Egypt’s Dar al-Ifta, official account of U.S. church delegation meeting with Grand Mufti Shawki Allam, September 10, 2017. Describes Egypt as a model of national unity and outlines the state’s counter-extremism message to visiting American church leaders.
Dar al-Ifta — U.S. church delegation meeting, September 10, 2017 [9] Joel C. Rosenberg, account of the November 1, 2017 evangelical delegation meeting with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Includes Rosenberg’s description of the delegation’s goals and the Egyptian presidency’s statement emphasizing citizenship, equality, and religious diversity.
Joel C. Rosenberg — Evangelical delegation meeting with President Sisi, November 1, 2017 [10] Protestant Churches of Egypt, account of Evangelical Presbyterian Church delegation visit, December 2023. Documents a senior American church delegation received by Zaki and the Evangelical Synod of the Nile.
Protestant Churches of Egypt — U.S. Presbyterian delegation visit, December 2023 [11] Protestant Churches of Egypt, meeting with Minister of Religious Endowments, September 2024. Documents participation by Zaki and visiting church representatives in a meeting with Egypt’s religious-endowments minister.
Protestant Churches of Egypt — Ministry of Religious Endowments meeting, September 2024 [12] Protestant Churches of Egypt, meeting with Pope Tawadros II, September 2024. Documents the related ecumenical delegation meeting with the Coptic Orthodox pope.
Protestant Churches of Egypt — Pope Tawadros II meeting, September 2024 [13] CEOSS, account of California Presbyterian evangelical delegation visit, May 26, 2025. Describes the visitors’ exposure to CEOSS development and dialogue programs and their favorable assessment of the organization.
CEOSS — California Presbyterian delegation visit, May 26, 2025 [14] Hands Along the Nile Development Services, organizational history. Describes HANDS’ partnership with CEOSS, Insight Trips, and Egyptian-American Dialogue activities.
HANDS — Organizational history [15] Hands Along the Nile Development Services, 2009 Annual Report. Describes Track Two Diplomacy, Insight Trips, development programs, and federal support including USAID-related assistance.
HANDS — 2009 Annual Report [16] Embassy of Egypt in Washington, “Virtual Event with Hands Along the Nile,” March 9, 2021. States that Ambassador Motaz Zahran discussed HANDS’ work and ways of promoting Egypt’s success stories in the United States.
Embassy of Egypt in Washington — HANDS event, March 9, 2021 [17] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Supplemental Statement, Andrea Zaki, January 12, 2026. Reports HANDS-related activity, federal registration efforts, and efforts connected to USAID/ASHA eligibility.
DOJ FARA — Andrea Zaki Supplemental Statement, January 12, 2026 [18] U.S. Department of Justice, FARA Supplemental Statement, Andrea Zaki, July 9, 2026. Reports the June 12, 2026 HANDS board meeting in New York as political activity for the Protestant Churches of Egypt.
DOJ FARA — Andrea Zaki Supplemental Statement, July 9, 2026 [19] Hands Along the Nile Development Services, 2010 Annual Report. Again lists USAID/ASHA among major supporters and provides additional information on HANDS’ development work.
HANDS — 2010 Annual Report [20] Egypt State Information Service, church-legalization committee update, April 2026. Reports that 3,804 churches and affiliated buildings had been approved for legalization.
Egypt State Information Service — Church legalization update, April 2026 [21] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2025 Egypt Country Update, February 2025. Describes the separate church-approval regime as discriminatory and documents attacks and restrictions affecting Coptic Christians.
USCIRF — 2025 Egypt Country Update [22] Egyptian Cabinet / State Information Service, approval of the draft Christian personal-status law, April 22, 2026. Announces Cabinet approval of the proposed law for Egyptian Christians.
Egypt State Information Service — Christian personal-status bill, April 22, 2026 [23] Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, “Egypt: Two Bills Introduced to Regulate Personal Status of Muslims and Christians,” May 20, 2026. Reports that the Christian personal-status bill remained under parliamentary committee review and could still be amended.
Library of Congress — Egypt personal-status bills, May 20, 2026 [24] UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note: Christians, Egypt, August 2026. Summarizes current evidence on the personal-status bill, church restrictions, identity issues, discrimination, and Coptic underrepresentation.
UK Home Office — Christians, Egypt, August 2026 [25] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: New Church Law Discriminates Against Christians,” September 15, 2016. Analyzes the 2016 church law and argues that it preserves discriminatory restrictions on Christian worship.
Human Rights Watch — Egypt church law, September 15, 2016 [26] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2026 Egypt Country Update, April 2026. Concludes that Egyptian authorities continued enforcing laws, policies, and judicial decisions that repress non-Muslim religious life and documents ongoing restrictions affecting Copts and other communities.
USCIRF — 2026 Egypt Country Update
