



EGYPT'S INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON

*Paid Lobbying, Congressional Gatekeepers,
and Religious Influence Networks*

A Three-Part Investigative Series

Consolidated Edition | October 2026

Coptic Solidarity

Research and advocacy concerning equal citizenship and religious freedom in Egypt

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PART I

Paid Lobbyists, Political Access, and the Friends of Egypt Caucus

Introduction

For years, members of Congress from both parties have introduced resolutions addressing discrimination and persecution affecting Egypt's Coptic Christians. Despite bipartisan support, these measures have repeatedly failed to advance. Why?

Part I of this investigation examines one part of the environment in which those resolutions must compete: Egypt's extensive and well-funded Washington influence operation. Federal lobbying disclosures show that Cairo has spent millions of dollars employing prominent Washington firms and former senior congressional insiders, including former House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce. They also reveal sustained efforts by Egypt's registered lobbyists to cultivate the Congressional Friends of Egypt Caucus—whose members now include key lawmakers overseeing U.S. policy toward Egypt.

None of this proves that lobbying determined the fate of any particular resolution. But it reveals a striking imbalance of access. The Egyptian government can deploy professional lobbyists, former congressional leaders and established bipartisan networks to make its case directly to those who shape U.S. policy. The Coptic victims whose rights Congress is being asked to defend have nothing remotely comparable. Part I examines how that system of access works. Part II will examine what happened when repeated congressional efforts on Coptic rights entered that system.

1. Egypt's Washington Operation

Royce operates inside a much larger influence infrastructure. Coptic Solidarity's review of federal disclosure records identified 13 firms and agents representing Egypt between late 2013 and early 2025, conducting more than 5,500 reported political activities and receiving approximately \$18.8 million from Cairo. The records showed repeated outreach to congressional offices, federal agencies, media organizations, think tanks and other institutions concerning U.S. aid, regional policy and Egypt's portrayal of its own human-rights and religious-freedom record.^[3]

Brownstein became Egypt's most active recent Washington representative, reporting more than **3,400 political activities after taking the account in 2020**, according to Coptic Solidarity's analysis of FARA records.^[3] The firm's Egypt operation also illustrates the value of Washington's revolving door. Royce brought decades of relationships on the Republican side, including six years leading Foreign Affairs. Elshami brought a different network. Brownstein's own biography notes his 25 years in Congress, culminating as chief of staff to Nancy Pelosi, and says he now leverages **"bicameral, bipartisan relationships"** while identifying political "pressure points" and activating influential legislators for clients.^[4] Egypt therefore did not simply purchase expertise about Washington. It purchased **Washington insiders who already knew the people it needed to reach.**

2. The Friends of Egypt Caucus

One Congressional institution increasingly appearing in this lobbying activity is the **Congressional Friends of Egypt Caucus**. The caucus predates Brownstein's 2020 contract with Egypt. House Administration records show that the Friends of Egypt Caucus was formally approved on May 23, 2014, initially under Republican Rep. Dana Rohrabacher and Democratic Rep. Loretta Sanchez.^[5] Its leadership has changed repeatedly while its fundamental purpose—building and maintaining the U.S.-Egypt relationship—has continued.

Today, official House records identify **Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL) and Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL)** as the caucus's bipartisan co-chairs.^[6] The caucus has no independent power to pass legislation or direct a congressional committee, but that does not mean it is without influence. It creates an organized network inside Congress centered specifically on relations with Egypt—facilitating meetings, policy discussions and engagement with Egyptian officials. That access is visible throughout the caucus's history.

In January 2016, then-co-chairs Rohrabacher and Rep. Tulsi Gabbard asked House Speaker Paul Ryan to invite President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to address a joint meeting of Congress. Their letter praised Sisi's leadership, calling his advocacy of tolerance and respect for people of all religions a major contribution to regional reconciliation and stability.^[7] Such language is important because **promoting Egypt as a model of religious tolerance has become a recurring theme of Cairo's public diplomacy in Washington.**

The caucus has also provided direct access to Egypt's president. In December 2022, then-co-chairs Diaz-Balart and Dutch Ruppersberger, joined by nine other members of Congress, met Sisi in Washington. Their congressional statement described Egypt as a valued partner in peace, counterterrorism and global security and expressed commitment to strengthening the relationship.[8]

Egypt's presidency described the meeting in even more expansive terms. According to the Egyptian government's account, members of the Friends of Egypt Caucus expressed appreciation for Egypt's role under Sisi in combating extremism, **"rectifying the religious discourse,"** and establishing values including **"freedom of belief, tolerance and acceptance of the other."**[9]

That religious-freedom narrative extends beyond the caucus itself and has become a recurring component of Egypt's broader Washington advocacy.

A very recent example came on **May 28, 2026**, when Egyptian Ambassador **Motaz Zahran** published a *Washington Times* op-ed titled **"Egypt's religious freedom tradition an asset to America, the world."** Zahran portrayed Egypt and the United States as sharing a similar commitment to religious pluralism and argued that President Sisi had made Egypt a regional model of tolerance. Six days later, Brownstein filed the article with the Justice Department as **FARA "Informational Materials" on behalf of Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.**[10][11]

The episode provides a clear example of Cairo's broader image-management strategy: presenting Egypt to American audiences not merely as improving religious freedom, but as sharing the same basic commitment to religious liberty as the United States. At the same time, independent U.S. and international religious-freedom reporting has continued to document serious restrictions and discrimination affecting Egyptian Christians and other religious minorities, directly contradicting this narrative.

Coptic Solidarity's analysis of FARA records found that image management—including repeated claims that Cairo was improving human rights and religious freedom—has been one of the identifiable objectives of Egypt's lobbying campaigns alongside preservation of U.S. aid and support for Egyptian regional-policy positions.[3]

There is nothing inherently improper about a Congressional caucus advocating a strong relationship with Egypt. The more revealing question is why **Egypt's paid foreign agents became so interested in cultivating this particular Congressional institution.**

3. Brownstein Turns to the Egypt Caucus

The answer appears in Brownstein's own FARA disclosures. During 2025, Brownstein reported repeated activity concerning the Friends of Egypt Caucus **on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt.**[12] The contacts were not simply mass emails. They involved members of Congress and senior congressional staff.

On March 26, 2025, Royce spoke directly by telephone with Rep. Jared Moskowitz. Brownstein reported the subject as **"U.S.-Egypt Relations."** The following day, Royce and Brownstein colleague Zachary Marshall contacted Moskowitz's deputy chief of staff, Clare Plassche, seeking a meeting. By April 1, Brownstein reported correspondence with Moskowitz's chief of staff and deputy chief of staff specifically described as a **"Request for a meeting re Egypt Caucus."**

On April 24, Royce and Brownstein colleague Douglas Maguire met with Moskowitz's chief and deputy chiefs of staff. Brownstein listed the purpose simply as **"Egypt Caucus,"** followed by a message on April 28 titled **"Follow-Up Egypt Caucus."** On April 30, Royce emailed Rep. Lois Frankel concerning the **"Egypt Caucus,"** with follow-up on May 1. Then, on **May 5**, Brownstein reported a meeting between Royce, Zachary Marshall and Moskowitz Deputy Chief of Staff Clare Plassche. Its disclosed purpose was unusually explicit: **"Discuss US-Egypt Relations and the Friends of Egypt Caucus."**[12] The activity continued. Brownstein's filings record additional Egypt Caucus contacts in June, including communications with Congressional offices about the caucus while Royce continued working on Egypt's behalf.[12] These records matter for what they establish—and for what they do not. They do not establish that Moskowitz, Frankel, or another member acted at Egypt's direction. They do not establish a quid pro quo, nor do they prove that any Congressional appointment or policy position resulted from Brownstein lobbying. But they establish something that requires no speculation:

Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid professional lobbyists—including a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—to cultivate relationships surrounding a congressional caucus specifically devoted to Egypt. And one of the principal lobbyists doing that work was Ed Royce.

4. The Revolving-Door Advantage

Royce's value to Egypt is inseparable from his **26 years in Congress and six years chairing the House Foreign Affairs Committee.** Those years produced relationships with legislators, congressional staff, diplomats and foreign officials, along with detailed knowledge of how Congress operates and which offices matter.[2]

After Royce left Congress in January 2019, Federal law imposed a **one-year post-employment lobbying restriction** on seeking official action from members or employees of Congress on behalf of others, as well as separate restrictions concerning representing, aiding or advising foreign entities for purposes of influencing U.S. federal officials.^[13] Brownstein registered Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a foreign principal on **November 9, 2020**, after that statutory period had expired, with Royce registered as one of the personnel working on the account.^{[1][14]} The arrangement was legal, but it illustrates the broader tension created by Washington's revolving door: relationships and institutional knowledge accumulated through public service can later become valuable assets for private clients—including foreign governments. **Public service creates the political capital. Private lobbying makes it saleable.**

5. The Caucus Moves Closer to the Center of Egypt Policy

The Friends of Egypt Caucus now sits at an increasingly important intersection of Congressional relationship-building and actual authority over Egypt policy. Its current co-chairs are Diaz-Balart and Moskowitz.^[6] Rep. **Mike Lawler**, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, publicly lists himself as a member of the Friends of Egypt Caucus.^[15]

And on **August 25, 2026**, House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats announced that **Moskowitz** would become **Ranking Member of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee**, succeeding Brad Sherman. Moskowitz had previously served as Ranking Member of the Oversight and Intelligence Subcommittee.^[16] There is no evidence that Brownstein's earlier lobbying had anything to do with that appointment. But the institutional overlap deserves attention.

The Republican chairman of the subcommittee responsible for Egypt is a Friends of Egypt Caucus member. The Democratic ranking member is the caucus's co-chair. And Egypt's registered lobbyists had already spent months working directly with that caucus and Moskowitz's office. That does not answer the question of influence, but it does make the question unavoidable.

6. Access Is the Product

Campaign contributions attract attention because they can be counted easily and money is a universal influencer. But they may not be the most important part of foreign influence in Washington. The more valuable commodity is often **access**.

Egypt can communicate with the United States through its embassy, as every government can. But it can also pay one of Washington's most powerful lobbying firms. That firm can assign a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to the account. That former chairman can call members he once served with, contact chiefs of staff, prepare meetings with Egyptian delegations, work Congressional committees and cultivate the Friends of Egypt Caucus. Every step can be legal. Every contact can be disclosed. And the cumulative result can still create a profound imbalance in democratic representation.

An Egyptian Christian whose church has been closed can hardly hire a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. A family seeking the return of a disappeared daughter cannot retain a bipartisan team of former congressional officials. An American constituent concerned about religious freedom in Egypt may write an email, make a telephone call, or ask for a meeting. Yet, the Egyptian government can do all of those things—and then add professional access purchased from people whose value was largely created by years inside the U.S. government.

That is why the central question is not whether a particular lobbyist bought a particular vote. It is whether the United States has built a system in which **publicly accumulated political capital can be converted too easily into a private asset for foreign governments**.

The Friends of Egypt Caucus demonstrates how that access can become institutional rather than episodic. Ed Royce demonstrates how relationships created by public service can become commercially valuable afterward. And Brownstein's FARA disclosures show that Cairo has been willing to pay to use both.

The next question is what happens when those networks intersect with Congressional power over legislation—and why repeated bipartisan resolutions addressing the rights of Egypt's Coptic Christians have struggled to move beyond committee.

That is the subject of Part II.

Sources and Endnotes

Blue, underlined source labels are active hyperlinks in the PDF.

[1] **U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act filing, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Exhibit A-B, November 9, 2020.** The filing identifies Egypt’s Foreign Ministry as the foreign principal. The attached engagement letter is addressed by Ed Royce to Ambassador Motaz Zahran; states that Royce and Nadeam Elshami would supervise the account; specifies a \$65,000 monthly retainer; requires annual travel by the senior team to Egypt; and is signed by Royce and the Egyptian ambassador.

[DOJ FARA filing — November 9, 2020](#)

[2] **Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, “Ed Royce.”** Brownstein describes Royce as a former HFAC chairman with “unparalleled relationships” with U.S. officials and sovereign leaders and explains how he leverages those relationships for clients.

[Brownstein — Ed Royce biography](#)

[3] **Mark Basta, Coptic Solidarity, “Cairo’s Covert Power in Washington: An Analysis of the Egyptian Lobby in the US since 2014,” June 2025.** The analysis of FARA records found approximately \$18.8 million in Egyptian lobbying contracts involving 13 firms/agents and more than 5,500 political activities; Brownstein accounted for more than 3,400 activities after 2020.

[Coptic Solidarity — Full report](#)

[4] **Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, “Nadeam A. Elshami.”** Brownstein describes Elshami’s 25-year congressional career, service as Pelosi’s chief of staff, bipartisan relationships and approach to activating influential legislators for clients.

[Brownstein — Nadeam Elshami biography](#)

[5] **U.S. House Committee on House Administration, 113th Congress Congressional Member Organizations.** Official House records list the Friends of Egypt Caucus as approved May 23, 2014, with Dana Rohrabacher and Loretta Sanchez as co-chairs.

[6] **U.S. House Committee on House Administration, 119th Congress Congressional Member Organizations.** Current House records list Mario Diaz-Balart and Jared Moskowitz as co-chairs of the Congressional Friends of Egypt Caucus.

[7] **Congressional Record, January 8, 2016.** Rohrabacher entered into the Congressional Record the letter he and Tulsi Gabbard sent to Speaker Paul Ryan requesting that Sisi address a joint meeting of Congress and praising his leadership and rhetoric on religious tolerance.

[8] **Office of Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, “Co-Chairs and Members of the Congressional Friends of Egypt Caucus Meet with President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi,” December 14, 2022.**

[Diaz-Balart — Friends of Egypt Caucus meeting with Sisi](#)

[9] **Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt, “President El-Sisi Meets Members of the Congressional Friends of Egypt Caucus,” December 14, 2022.** Egypt’s official account says participating members praised Cairo’s efforts in combating extremism, reforming religious discourse and promoting freedom of belief, tolerance and acceptance.

[Egyptian Presidency — December 14, 2022 meeting](#)

[10] **Motaz Zahran, “Egypt’s religious freedom tradition an asset to America, the world,” *The Washington Times*, May 28, 2026.** Zahran portrayed Egypt and the United States as sharing a commitment to religious pluralism and presented President Sisi’s policies as evidence that Egypt had become a regional model of religious tolerance. A copy of the published article was subsequently filed with the Department of Justice under Brownstein’s FARA registration for Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[DOJ FARA copy of Washington Times op-ed](#)

[11] **U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act filing, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, June 3, 2026.** Brownstein filed Zahran’s *Washington Times* op-ed as “Informational Materials” on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt under Registration No. 5870.

[DOJ FARA — Brownstein Registration No. 5870](#)

[12] **U.S. Department of Justice, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck Supplemental Statement, September 30, 2025.** The filing records Royce’s March 26 phone call with Moskowitz on U.S.-Egypt relations; subsequent meeting requests; repeated April and May “Egypt Caucus” and “Follow-Up Egypt Caucus” contacts; and meetings described as discussing “US-Egypt Relations and the Friends of Egypt Caucus.”

[DOJ FARA — Brownstein September 2025 Supplemental Statement](#)

[13] **U.S. House Committee on Ethics, post-employment restrictions; 18 U.S.C. § 207.** House ethics guidance states that former members are subject to a one-year restriction on communications or appearances before Congress intended to influence official action on behalf of others, as well as a one-year restriction on representing, aiding or advising certain foreign entities in efforts to influence U.S. federal officials.

[House Ethics — Post-employment restrictions](#)

[14] **U.S. Department of Justice FARA database, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Registration No. 5870.** The database records the November 9, 2020 registrations for Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, Royce, Elshami and other Brownstein personnel.

[DOJ FARA — Brownstein filings](#)

[15] **Office of Rep. Mike Lawler, “Committees and Caucuses.”** Lawler’s official congressional page lists him as a member of the Friends of Egypt Caucus.

[Rep. Lawler — Committees and Caucuses](#)

[16] **House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats, “Meeks Welcomes New Members to HFAC,” August 25, 2026.** The announcement names Moskowitz Ranking Member of the MENA Subcommittee and states that Jonathan Jackson would succeed him as Ranking Member of Oversight and Intelligence.

[HFAC Democrats — August 25, 2026 announcement](#)

PART II

When Access Shapes the Agenda: Egypt's Lobby and the Gatekeepers of U.S. Policy

Congress has repeatedly demonstrated bipartisan concern over the treatment of Egypt's Coptic Christians. Three resolutions introduced between 2017 and 2021 attracted dozens of Republican and Democratic cosponsors. A fourth is now pending.

H.Res. 776, introduced by Republican Rep. French Hill with Democratic Rep. Tom Suozzi, calls on Egypt to protect equal citizenship and religious freedom, end impunity for attacks against Copts, and address discriminatory policies—while explicitly recognizing the importance of the U.S.-Egypt partnership.^[1]

At the same time, Egypt has built an extensive lobbying operation in Washington. FARA disclosures show its registered representatives repeatedly seeking access to congressional offices occupying influential positions in U.S.-Egypt policy.

There is nothing inherently objectionable about that. Egypt has legitimate interests to represent in Washington, from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to regional security and military cooperation. The issue examined here is more specific: **how does Cairo use its Washington network when Congressional attention turns from shared strategic interests to criticism of Egypt's own treatment of its citizens?**

The available evidence does not establish that Egyptian lobbying caused previous Coptic resolutions to stall, nor does it establish the extent to which such lobbying may have influenced members of Congress contacted by Egypt's representatives. It does document the access Cairo has developed to offices through which congressional policy toward Egypt is considered.

Access Where the Agenda Is Set

The House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) is the principal House committee responsible for U.S. foreign policy. Its Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee (MENA) covers Egypt.

At the full committee level, Chairman Brian Mast (R-FL) and Ranking Member Gregory Meeks (D-NY) occupy the principal Republican and Democratic leadership positions. At MENA, Chairman Mike Lawler (R-NY) and Ranking Member Jared Moskowitz (D-FL) hold the corresponding positions overseeing the region.^[2]

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Egypt's registered lobbying firm, has documented Egypt-related contacts with the offices of all four.^{[4][5][6]}

As detailed in Part I, Brownstein repeatedly engaged Lawler and Moskowitz's offices concerning U.S.-Egypt relations and the Congressional Friends of Egypt Caucus. Moskowitz is now the caucus's Democratic co-chair, while Lawler is a member.^{[3][4]}

Former HFAC Chairman Ed Royce, working through Brownstein, contacted Meeks's office in January 2021 to invite staff to a virtual discussion with Egypt's ambassador.^[5] In September 2024, Brownstein approached several Meeks staffers regarding a requested meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty.^[6]

Mast's office was contacted in 2021 regarding an Egyptian Embassy briefing on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and again in 2024 concerning an Egyptian Military Coordination Committee delegation.^{[5][6][8]}

Much of this is routine representation of a foreign government's interests in Washington. Contacts concerning the Nile dispute, military relations or regional security are not in themselves the concern of this report. They are relevant because they show the breadth of the relationships and channels that Egypt's representatives have established across the congressional structure dealing with Egypt.

Those same channels remain available when the subject changes—from matters on which Cairo seeks American cooperation to matters on which Cairo itself faces congressional criticism.

Bipartisan Support—and the Next Step

The record of Coptic resolutions shows that concern over Coptic rights has extended well beyond a handful of sympathetic legislators.

H.Res. 673, introduced in 2017, accumulated **54 cosponsors**. H.Res. 49, introduced in 2019, reached **76 cosponsors**. H.Res. 117, introduced in 2021, gained **38 cosponsors**.^[11]

These numbers represent a significant **advocacy achievement**. Congressional Research Service guidance notes that lawmakers seek cosponsors to demonstrate support and improve a measure's prospects for passage.^[10] Each additional cosponsor also places another member of Congress publicly behind the concerns and demands contained in the resolution.

Coptic advocacy sought to **build upon that support**. In 2018, a multi-faith coalition asked then-HFAC Chairman Ed Royce to markup H.Res. 673. In 2020, another coalition urged MENA leadership to advance H.Res. 49, emphasizing its 76 bipartisan cosponsors.^[12] H.Res. 117 subsequently attracted 38 cosponsors.

None of the three ultimately proceeded to final House consideration.^{[9][11]}

That **does not reduce their importance to symbolism**. The accumulation of bipartisan cosponsors itself demonstrated congressional concern and created a public record that could be cited in dealings with Congress, the administration and the Egyptian government. Formal House approval would have carried the process further: placing the House behind the resolution's demands, increasing their diplomatic weight and making it considerably harder for Cairo to portray criticism of its treatment of Copts as marginal.

The record does not establish why that additional step was never reached. It does identify the congressional offices occupying key gatekeeping positions through which such measures had to pass. For Cairo, maintaining relationships with those offices was plainly valuable.

Rep. Gregory Meeks's history illustrates the relevance of such access. Meeks cosponsored H.Res. 673 in January 2018.^[13] After he became HFAC chairman, Brownstein—by then representing Egypt—contacted his office regarding a discussion with Egypt's ambassador.^[5] The next Coptic resolution, H.Res. 117, was introduced the following month and eventually attracted 38 cosponsors without advancing beyond committee.^{[7][11]}

There is no recorded evidence that Brownstein asked Meeks to block H.Res. 117 or that Egyptian lobbying caused him to change his position. The public record does, however, show a notable change in circumstances: Rep. Meeks had cosponsored H.Res. 673 in 2018. After he became HFAC chairman—and after Egypt had established direct lobbying access to his office—the successor resolution, H.Res. 117, received neither a markup nor a vote. The reason is not established, but the chronology illustrates where lobbying access and congressional agenda-setting can intersect.

H.Res. 776 and Egypt's Washington Network

H.Res. 776 was introduced on September 30, 2025. As of September 1, 2026, it had eight cosponsors—four Republicans and four Democrats—and remained before HFAC.^{[1][14]4]}

Its present status is not evidence that Egypt or Brownstein has blocked it. Brownstein's filings describe a network extending well beyond any particular resolution. Its representatives have sought or facilitated contacts involving Egypt's ambassador, foreign minister and military officials; approached Republican and Democratic offices; engaged full-committee and subcommittee leadership; and worked around the Friends of Egypt Caucus.

Again, the existence of that network is not itself the issue. Egypt is entitled to promote its position on the Nile, regional security, military cooperation and other matters affecting its national interests. But when Congress addresses discrimination against Copts, religious freedom, political prisoners or other human-rights abuses, the nature of the discussion changes. **Egypt is no longer simply promoting its position on a bilateral or regional question; its own policies and practices are the subject of congressional concern.**

That distinction is particularly relevant because **Congress is responsible for overseeing substantial American assistance to Egypt**. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 provides \$1.375 billion in Foreign Military Financing, above Egypt's longstanding \$1.3 billion annual baseline. Human-rights-related conditions apply to part of that assistance, although national-security waiver authority remains available.^[15]

Coptic rights and other human-rights questions therefore do not exist outside the U.S.-Egypt policy relationship. They form part of congressional debate over the terms on which that relationship—and substantial American support for it—should continue.

H.Res. 776 is now pending within a congressional structure where Egypt's representatives have spent years developing access. Its progress therefore deserves to be viewed against that documented background—not as evidence that lobbying has determined its fate, but as another instance in which Cairo has both a strong interest in the outcome and established channels to offices involved in the congressional process.

Three earlier resolutions demonstrated that substantial bipartisan congressional support for Coptic rights can be built. H.Res. 776 offers another opportunity to translate such support into a formal House position. **It also brings the central issue examined in this report into particularly sharp focus: how Egypt's well-funded Washington operation functions when congressional attention shifts from shared strategic interests to criticism of Cairo's own policies and practices.**

Sources and Endnotes

Blue, underlined source labels are active hyperlinks in the PDF.

[1] U.S. Government Publishing Office, H.Res. 776, 119th Congress, introduced September 30, 2025. The official text identifies Rep. French Hill as sponsor and Rep. Tom Suozzi as original cosponsor, recognizes the importance of the U.S.-Egypt relationship, and calls for equal rights, religious freedom and accountability for abuses affecting Coptic Christians. The official legislative record shows referral to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

[Official H.Res. 776 text and legislative record — GovInfo](#)

[2] House Foreign Affairs Committee, 119th Congress Committee roster and rules; MENA Subcommittee jurisdiction; House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats, August 25, 2026. Brian Mast serves as HFAC chairman and Gregory Meeks as Ranking Member. Committee rules state that the chairman determines the business considered at committee meetings after consultation with the Ranking Minority Member. Mike Lawler chairs MENA, whose regional jurisdiction corresponds to the State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. On August 25, 2026, Meeks announced Jared Moskowitz as the new MENA Ranking Member. [HFAC full committee roster — 119th Congress HFAC MENA Subcommittee HFAC rules — 119th Congress \(official PDF\)](#)

[HFAC Democrats — August 25, 2026 announcement](#)

[3] Office of Rep. Mike Lawler; Office of Rep. Jared Moskowitz. Lawler’s official congressional page lists him as a member of the Friends of Egypt Caucus. Moskowitz’s office identifies him and Mario Diaz-Balart as co-chairs of the caucus. [Rep. Mike Lawler — Committees and Caucuses](#)

[Rep. Jared Moskowitz — Friends of Egypt Caucus co-chair reference](#)

[4] U.S. Department of Justice, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck FARA Supplemental Statements, Registration No. 5870, March 30 and September 30, 2025. The disclosures record Egypt-account contacts with Mike Lawler’s office and repeated contacts with Jared Moskowitz’s office. A June 17, 2025, meeting between Ed Royce, Zachary Marshall and Moskowitz Deputy Chief of Staff Clare Plassche is described as “Discuss US-Egypt Relations and the Friends of Egypt Caucus.” [DOJ FARA — Brownstein Supplemental Statement, March 30, 2025](#)

[DOJ FARA — Brownstein Supplemental Statement, September 30, 2025](#)

[5] U.S. Department of Justice, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck Supplemental Statement, March 30, 2021, Registration No. 5870. Brownstein disclosed acquiring Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a foreign principal on November 9, 2020. The filing records Ed Royce’s January 7, 2021, contact with Gregory Meeks staff regarding an invitation to a virtual discussion with Egypt’s ambassador and his January 28 contact with Brian Mast’s chief of staff regarding an invitation to a GERD briefing.

[DOJ FARA — Brownstein Supplemental Statement, March 30, 2021](#)

[6] U.S. Department of Justice, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck Supplemental Statement, March 30, 2025, Registration No. 5870. The filing records outreach to Gregory Meeks staff regarding a September 2024 meeting request for Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. It also records October 21, 2024, contacts by Ed Royce and Brownstein colleagues with Brian Mast staff requesting attendance at an Egyptian Military Coordination Committee delegation meeting.

[DOJ FARA — Brownstein Supplemental Statement, March 30, 2025](#)

[7] Federal Election Commission filings, Friends for Gregory Meeks. Brownstein’s BHFS-E PC PAC contributed \$4,000 on January 25, 2023, followed by \$2,500 on May 16, 2025, and \$1,000 on June 30, 2025, for at least \$7,500 across those filings. [FEC — Friends for Gregory Meeks filing showing January 25, 2023 BHFS-E PC PAC contribution](#)

[FEC — Friends for Gregory Meeks filing showing May 16 and June 30, 2025 BHFS-E PC PAC contributions](#)

[8] Federal Election Commission, BHFS-E PC PAC Year-End Report, 2025. The filing records a \$3,000 contribution to Mast for Congress on December 1, 2025.

[FEC — BHFS-E PC PAC 2025 Year-End Report](#)

[9] Congressional Record, “Résumé of Congressional Activity,” First Session of the 119th Congress. Official congressional statistics record 973 House simple resolutions introduced during 2025 and 100 agreed to by the House. The figures include resolutions on a wide range of substantive and procedural subjects and therefore provide general legislative context rather than a direct comparison to foreign-policy resolutions.

[Congressional Record — Interim Résumé of Congressional Activity, First Session of the 119th Congress](#)

[10] Congressional Research Service, “Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills,” updated August 14, 2025; CRS, “Suspension of the Rules: House Practice in the 116th Congress,” December 7, 2022. CRS explains that supporters seek cosponsors to demonstrate support and improve a measure’s prospects for passage. Its study of suspension procedure found that House leaders generally use the procedure for broadly supported legislation and that 53 of 54 House resolutions considered under suspension in the 116th Congress were approved. [CRS — Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills \(RS22477\)](#)

[CRS — Suspension of the Rules: House Practice in the 116th Congress \(R47327\)](#)

[11] Congressional legislative records for H.Res. 673, H.Res. 49 and H.Res. 117. H.Res. 673 ultimately accumulated 54 cosponsors without advancing beyond the introduced stage; H.Res. 49 accumulated 76 cosponsors and was referred to the MENA Subcommittee but received no floor vote; H.Res. 117 accumulated 38 cosponsors, with its only recorded action being referral to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 11, 2021. [Congress.gov — H.Res. 673 \(115th Congress\)](#) [Congress.gov — H.Res. 49 \(116th Congress\)](#)
[Congress.gov — H.Res. 117 \(117th Congress\)](#)

[12] Coptic Solidarity / International Religious Freedom Roundtable coalition advocacy, 2018 and 2020. In October 2018, a multi-faith letter signed by 41 organizations and individuals asked HFAC Chairman Ed Royce and MENA Chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to markup H.Res. 673 and bring it to the floor. In September 2020, a coalition of 25 organizations and individuals asked MENA leadership to markup H.Res. 49, citing its 76 bipartisan cosponsors. [2018 coalition letter requesting markup of H.Res. 673](#)
[2020 IRF Roundtable coalition letter requesting markup of H.Res. 49](#)

[13] H.Res. 673 cosponsor record. Gregory Meeks joined H.Res. 673 as a cosponsor on January 16, 2018. The historical cosponsor list reproduced by Coptic Solidarity links individual entries to Congress.gov and identifies Meeks's date of cosponsorship. [Congress.gov — H.Res. 673 cosponsors](#)
[Coptic Solidarity — H.Res. 673 historical advocacy/cosponsor page](#)

[14] Current Congress.gov-derived legislative data for H.Res. 776, accessed September 1, 2026. The resolution has eight current cosponsors: Democrats Tom Suozzi, Brad Sherman, Mike Levin and Josh Gottheimer; and Republicans Gus Bilirakis, Nicole Malliotakis, Keith Self and Young Kim. Its recorded activity remains limited to introduction and referral to HFAC on September 30, 2025. [Congress.gov — H.Res. 776 cosponsors](#)
[Congress.gov — H.Res. 776 actions and status](#)

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PART III

The Religious Lobby: How Egypt's Influence Network Turns Nominal Progress Into a False Narrative

The first two articles in Coptic Solidarity's *Egyptian Influence* series examined Egypt's conventional lobbying operation—Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Ed Royce, and the Friends of Egypt Caucus—and how that access intersects with Congressional gatekeepers. This third article looks at a less obvious channel: religious, nonprofit, and development networks that can carry the same message with different forms of credibility.

On May 1, 2025, Rev. Dr. Andrea Zaki, the President of the Evangelical Community in Egypt, and an Egyptian delegation met Patrick Harvey, then acting U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom.

According to Zaki's own federal disclosure (FARA), the delegation presented what it called the "positive developments" in religious freedom under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It described Egypt's progress as a "model transformation" and pointed to the proposed personal-status law for Christians and the law governing church construction as significant advances.^[1]

But this was not simply a Christian Evangelical leader offering his personal assessment of conditions in Egypt. The delegation brought together representatives of the Egyptian government, Parliament, the government-appointed National Council for Human Rights, state-linked media, Egyptian and American religious organizations, and the U.S. nonprofit Hands Along the Nile Development Services.

Together, they carried substantially the same message into meetings with members of Congress, State Department officials, the United Nations, an influential think tank, American church leaders, and the official responsible for evaluating religious freedom around the world.

This is how Egypt's religious influence network operates. Each participant contributes a distinct form of authority: government officials provide official assurances; parliamentarians and national human-rights figures confer institutional legitimacy; state-linked media amplify the message; Egyptian Christian leaders provide religious validation; American nonprofits and churches provide trusted domestic platforms; and professional lobbyists obtain access and place the same narrative before policymakers and the public. The result can look like independent corroboration. In reality, the same selective account of Egypt's progress is moving through an interconnected network.

A religious leader registered to influence American policy

Andrea Zaki is president of the Protestant Churches of Egypt and president of the **Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services**, commonly known as **CEOSS**.^[2] He is also an individual registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. His registration, No. 7124, identifies the Protestant Churches of Egypt as his disclosed foreign principal.^[3]

In that filing, Zaki said he meets members of Congress and State Department officials to explain conditions in Egypt, especially the situation of Christians, Muslim-Christian relations, and civil society. He answered "Yes" when asked whether his work would include political activity; the FARA form asks registrants to describe such activity under categories that include "lobbying, promotion, perception management, public relations," "economic development," and the dissemination of informational materials. His subsequent filings classify meetings with U.S. officials, members of Congress, religious organizations, and HANDS as political activities conducted for the Protestant Churches of Egypt.^[3]

That classification is important. Zaki's U.S. engagements are not limited to pastoral visits or church fellowship. His filings describe an **organized effort to influence American understanding of Egyptian affairs**, including religious freedom, bilateral relations, investment, development assistance, regional security, and Egypt's international image.

In March 2023, for example, Zaki distributed an Egyptian government investment link to American religious leaders and HANDS Executive Director Jennifer Cate "to encourage to invest in Egypt."^[4] During a May 2023 visit, he reported meetings with members of Congress, State Department officials, the U.S. ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. His talking points included alleged progress on religious freedom, civil society, women's empowerment, anti-torture measures, and economic reform.^[5]

The most extensive disclosed campaign occurred from April 29 to May 2, 2025.

A coordinated advocacy campaign

The composition of Zaki's 2025 delegation reveals how the different parts of the network reinforce one another. The group included Tarek Radwan, chairman of the Egyptian Parliament's Human Rights Committee; Mahmoud Kareem and Samira Luka of the National Council for Human Rights; Ayman Abu Omar of the Ministry of (Islamic) Endowments; Ezzat Ibrahim of *Al-Ahram Weekly* and *Ahram Online*; HANDS Executive Director Jennifer Cate; Global Ministries representative Peter Makari; and Zaki himself.[1]

The delegation held a roundtable at the United Nations with officials from the **UN Alliance of Civilizations** and the head of the United Church of Christ. It met Representatives Anna Paulina Luna, Kevin Hern, George Latimer, and Chuck Edwards, as well as Senator James Lankford. It had breakfast at the residence of Egyptian Ambassador Motaz Zahran. It met Faris Asad, director of the **State Department's Office of North African Affairs**; Council on Foreign Relations fellow Steven Cook; and Acting Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Patrick Harvey.

The discussions addressed religious freedom, human rights, national dialogue, regional stability, investment, economic reconstruction, and what the filing called the "stability of Christians in Egypt."

At one meeting, the delegation reportedly explained what it depicted as human-rights reforms Egypt had implemented. At another, it discussed "positive developments" in religious freedom and the proposed personal-status law for Copts. With the acting religious-freedom ambassador, it characterized Egypt's progress as a "model transformation."

These were not incidental conversations. Zaki **disclosed the activities** to the Justice Department as political work for the Protestant Churches of Egypt.[1]

Global Ministries describes the broader Egyptian-U.S. Dialogue Initiative as a collaboration between CEOSS, American churches, and ecumenical organizations. Its partners have included the United Church of Christ, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church (USA), National Council of Churches, and Churches for Middle East Peace. The initiative had held seven encounters by 2025.[6]

Policymakers were receiving a favorable assessment of Egypt through participants carrying governmental, parliamentary, human-rights, media, religious, and nonprofit credentials. What can appear to be confirmation from several sectors was, in this instance, being advanced by the same delegation.

From conventional lobbying to religious validation

The message carried by Zaki's delegation closely resembles the message promoted through Egypt's conventional lobbying operation.

On May 28, 2026, *The Washington Times* published an opinion article by (now former) Egyptian Ambassador Motaz Zahran titled "Egypt's Religious Freedom Tradition an Asset to America, the World." Its subtitle declared that Sisi "walks the walk on tolerance for all faiths."

The article portrayed **Egypt and the United States as countries with a shared commitment to religious diversity**. It cited Sisi's Christmas appearances, the construction of the Cathedral of the Nativity, the legalization of church buildings, restoration of Jewish sites, and the still-unfinished personal-status law for Christians. It concluded that Egypt was becoming a regional model for religious freedom.

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Egypt's registered lobbying firm, subsequently filed the article with the Justice Department as informational material disseminated for Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[7]

The similarity is striking

Zaki's religious delegation described Egypt as a "model transformation." Egypt's ambassador described it as a "regional role model." Both relied on substantially the same selective evidence: presidential gestures toward Christians, legalization of existing church buildings, the proposed personal-status law, high-profile state religious projects, and official claims of coexistence.

The professional lobbyist and the Christian leader serve different functions. Brownstein places the foreign government's case before officials and the American public. Zaki and his religious partners give substantially the same argument a Christian, humanitarian, and civil-society voice.

One message arrives as foreign-government advocacy. The other may be received as testimony from Christian leaders describing the experiences of their own community. That distinction makes the religious channel especially valuable.

American delegations and the curated experience of Egypt

The influence also moves in the other direction. American religious leaders are brought to Egypt, given high-level access, and introduced to the country through officials and religious institutions that emphasize national unity, tolerance, stability, and the fight against extremism.

On September 10, 2017, Zaki accompanied a high-level delegation of American church leaders to meet Egypt's Grand Mufti Shawki Allam. The government religious institution told the visitors that Egyptian society represented a model of national unity and resistance to sectarianism. The mufti also briefed them on the state's efforts to combat extremism and terrorism. [8]

Less than two months later, Zaki joined Sisi and Egyptian intelligence chief Khalid Fawzi for a three-hour meeting with what participants described as the first delegation of American evangelical leaders received by the president.

The visit originated with Sisi himself. During an earlier meeting in Washington, he invited American author and Evangelical leader Joel Rosenberg to bring a delegation to Cairo. Rosenberg later wrote that he and the other participants came to build a long-term friendship with Sisi and Egypt's leadership.

His account praised Sisi for fighting Islamist terrorism, protecting Christians, rebuilding churches, stabilizing Egypt, and repairing the U.S.-Egyptian alliance. The Egyptian presidency's accompanying statement emphasized citizenship, equality, religious diversity, and non-discrimination. The American delegation, in turn, praised Egypt as a cornerstone of regional stability and moderation. [9]

The same pattern has continued.

In December 2023, Zaki and leaders of the Evangelical Synod of the Nile received a senior delegation from the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in the United States. [10] In September 2024, he participated in meetings between Egypt's minister of Islamic endowments, Pope Tawadros II, a delegation from the South African Council of Churches, and representatives of American churches. [11][12]

In May 2025, Zaki received Presbyterian evangelical leaders from California at CEOSS. He presented CEOSS's development, education, health care, economic-empowerment, dialogue, and peacebuilding programs. The visitors praised the organization as an inspiring model combining spiritual mission, development, citizenship, and human dignity. [13]

These delegations do not merely hear claims about Egypt from a distance. They **experience hospitality, personal relationships**, development projects, religious meetings, and unusually senior government access. The resulting impressions can then return to the United States as eyewitness testimony from respected American Christian leaders.

But the experience is structured. The visitors principally encounter Egypt through the institutions, projects, officials, and religious figures selected to receive them.

The network also reaches directly into America's religious-freedom establishment: Zaki met the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom in 2023, and his 2025 delegation presented its "model transformation" narrative directly to Acting Ambassador Patrick Harvey.

This brought the network's message directly to the office charged with evaluating whether foreign governments protect or violate religious freedom.

The significance is not simply that Zaki obtained a meeting. It is what the delegation placed before the official: a coordinated presentation in which Egyptian government, parliamentary, national human-rights, media, religious, and nonprofit representatives collectively described the government's policies as evidence of major reform.

HANDS: A nonprofit bridge

Hands Along the Nile provides much of the institutional infrastructure connecting **development, religious engagement, public diplomacy**, and American audiences.

HANDS describes itself as an Egyptian-American nonprofit building bridges between the two countries. Its work includes development projects, professional exchanges, educational programs, American visits to Egypt, and the Egyptian-American dialogue. [14]

Its earlier annual reports are particularly revealing about the intended function of these programs. HANDS described its "**Track Two Diplomacy**" as bringing together "non-official but influential" people from the two countries. Its Egyptian-American dialogue convened participants from the media, academia, civil society, and religious leadership. Its "Insight Trips" brought Americans to Egypt for historical visits, encounters with Egyptians, meals in private homes, and tours of projects supported by the organization.

In 2009 alone, HANDS coordinated three such trips. Its report explained that direct exposure could challenge existing perceptions of Egypt and the Middle East.^[15] The Egyptian Embassy later described the organization's public-diplomacy function even more explicitly. On March 9, 2021, Ambassador Motaz Zahran participated in a virtual HANDS event addressing its community work and "ways of promoting Egypt's success stories in the United States."^[16]

Zaki sits on the HANDS board. His FARA filings show that he attended a board meeting in Washington on October 17, 2025, followed by another in New York on June 12, 2026. The meetings concerned development projects in Egypt. Zaki reported both as activities for the Protestant Churches of Egypt, and his latest filing classified the 2026 HANDS meeting as political activity.^{[17][18]} HANDS therefore does more than finance charitable projects. Its own records describe an organization **connecting influential people, shaping perceptions, hosting exchanges**, introducing Americans to selected Egyptian institutions, and promoting Egyptian success stories in the United States.

Religious exchange, charitable development, and registered advocacy are not improper. However, HANDS becomes relevant because it operates across several overlapping networks that can carry the same selective account of Egypt's religious-freedom record to American audiences and policymakers.

How selective progress becomes a false narrative

The Egyptian government has taken some steps concerning Christian institutions. Thousands of existing, previously unlicensed churches and service buildings have been approved for preliminary legalization; in April 2026, the government said the total had reached 3,804.^[20] Sisi shows up for a few minutes at Coptic Christmas celebrations. The state constructed a prominent cathedral in its new administrative capital, but it was fully financed by Coptic-owned businesses.

The government has also highlighted religious-heritage projects, including efforts to revive the Holy Family Trail, which USCIRF noted in both its 2025 and 2026 reporting. Earlier USCIRF reporting identified sites associated with that effort, including Muharraq Monastery in al-Qusiya and the Monastery of the Virgin Mary in Durunka, and also documented the restoration of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo and Eliyahu Hanavi Synagogue in Alexandria.^[21]

These initiatives are worthwhile in their own right. But restoring religious monuments, legalizing existing church buildings, and making symbolic gestures toward Christians are not the same as guaranteeing equal religious freedom. They coexist with a separate legal regime governing Christian places of worship and with a much broader system of religious inequality.^{[21][25][26]}

These facts provide the raw material for the narrative. The distortion occurs when visible, often superficial, gestures and limited administrative measures are treated as proof of equal citizenship and comprehensive religious reform.

Consider the personal-status law for Christians. Zaki's delegation presented the proposed law to American officials as evidence of progress in May 2025. Yet the draft did not reach the Egyptian Parliament that year.

The Cabinet approved a new draft for Egyptian Christians in April 2026, and the government referred it to Parliament in May.^{[14][15]} An August 2026 UK government country note stated that Parliament was still debating the draft as of July and that no further information on its progress or implementation had been located.^[16]

Even that description understates the uncertainty surrounding the proposal. The draft itself remains controversial, and its full text has not been publicly available for comprehensive examination by all interested parties. Questions therefore remain not only about whether and when the law will be enacted, but also about whether its final provisions would actually remedy existing discrimination or introduce new problems.

Yet before those questions had been resolved—and before the law had even been enacted—the proposal was already being presented abroad as evidence of religious-freedom progress.

A proposed and still-contested law cannot reasonably be treated as an accomplished reform.

These issues of the personal status law and church construction represent only a small part of the larger citizenship problem.

Even if Egypt enacted an acceptable Christian personal-status law and replaced the discriminatory church-construction regime, Copts and other religious minorities would still not enjoy equal citizenship.

Religious identity remains embedded throughout Egyptian law and administration. Administrative practices effectively prevent Muslims who adopt another faith from officially changing their religious affiliation. Religious identity remains recorded in official documentation and affects areas of civil life. Blasphemy and related laws criminalize forms of religious expression. Non-Muslims remain severely underrepresented in judicial, administrative, military, security, and executive positions. Sunni religious institutions have expanded their influence across education, public administration, and public policy. And more than a decade after Egypt's Constitution required an independent anti-discrimination commission, that institution still has not been established.^{[16][18][19]}

These structural inequalities are compounded by the daily realities facing Copts: church closures and restrictions, sectarian and mob violence, coercive reconciliation practices, discriminatory treatment within state institutions, obstacles involving religious identity and conversion, unequal access to positions of authority, and prosecutions under blasphemy and related speech laws.[16][18][19]

Coptic Solidarity's 2026 report *Erosion of Citizenship in Egypt* describes the larger trajectory as a widening divide between constitutional guarantees of equality and a system of state-managed religious governance in which religious identity increasingly shapes legal rights, public participation, education, and access to state authority.[19]

USCIRF has reached similarly troubling conclusions. Its reporting has documented sectarian attacks and persistent discrimination despite the government's highly visible overtures toward Christian institutions.[13] Its 2026 Egypt update concluded that Egyptian authorities continued systematically enforcing laws, policies, and judicial decisions that repress non-Muslim religious life.[18]

The “model transformation” story does not have to deny every individual abuse. It works by shifting the criteria by which Egypt is judged.

A cathedral and legalization of some existing churches substitute for genuine freedom to build, repair, and operate places of worship. Presidential Christmas appearance substitutes for equal citizenship.

Foreign-financed development achievements are presented as proof of civic progress while independent civil society remains constrained.

A proposed law substitutes for scrutiny of legal and institutional discrimination and reform of the broader system of religiously unequal law.

The testimony of prominent Christian leaders presenting the government's narrative substitutes for the voices of Christians who report discrimination or persecution.

Each selected fact may have some elements of truth. The conclusion assembled from them is false.

An echo chamber presented as independent confirmation

Washington is not hearing Egypt's case from a single source. It hears it from an ambassador writing in an American newspaper; from Egyptian parliamentarians and government-appointed human-rights officials; from a former congressional chairman working through a registered lobbying firm; and from a Christian leader registered under FARA. It also hears it through a U.S. nonprofit, American church partners, visiting delegations, interfaith events, and development programs.

Because these voices occupy different institutional roles, their statements can appear to confirm one another. But the public record shows that many of the participants travel together, participate in the same dialogue initiatives, sit on the same boards, meet the same officials, and repeatedly invoke the same examples to support substantially the same conclusions.

This is the power of Egypt's religious influence network. It does not merely deny abuses. It **surrounds American policymakers with a more reassuring interpretation** of them—one repeated by enough different kinds of messengers that **coordinated narrative begins to look like consensus**.

The effect is to obscure independent religious-freedom reporting that documents a reality the ‘model transformation’ narrative cannot explain: discrimination is legally established, and prevails through policies and practices, sectarian attacks continue, promised reforms remain unfinished, and Coptic appeals for equal citizenship still struggle to receive the same access and institutional reinforcement.

Egypt's influence campaign relies on presenting selective nominal changes as the dominant frame through which all other evidence is interpreted.

Sources and Endnotes

Blue, underlined source labels are active hyperlinks in the PDF.

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