By Hanan Fikry – Watani
The issue is not about a particular religion, nor about the name of a specific group. The issue is a principle that raises a fundamental question: should freedom of belief be absolute, or should it be subject to certain conditions?
The Constitution offers a clear answer. Article 64 of the Egyptian Constitution states: “Freedom of belief is absolute.” A definitive provision—but its interpretation is complex, and its application even more so.
Looking at the rest of the text: “Freedom of belief is absolute. The freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of worship for the followers of the Abrahamic religions is a right regulated by law.” This clause refers the matter to the legislature, according to its discretion. This has opened the door to legal interpretations that distinguish between “belief” as an internal state and “practice,” as well as the extent to which public expression of unrecognized beliefs may be considered lawful.
Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court issued a ruling in 2022 (Appeal No. 88826 of Judicial Year 67, dated June 25, 2022), in which it held that freedom of belief is protected so long as it remains within its internal sphere, without publicly expressing views that contradict the Abrahamic religions. This judicial interpretation draws a dividing line between belief as an individual right and its expression as an act that may be subject to restrictions, while maintaining the guarantee of religious practice for the followers of the three recognized religions.
Here, ambiguity begins: is belief truly free—or conditioned upon silence? This raises a legal dilemma regarding the consistency of such restrictions with the constitutional provision describing freedom of belief as “absolute.”
It is therefore not surprising that news emerged of the renewal of the detention of 16 defendants in Case No. 2025 of 2025, known in the media as the “Ahmadi Religion Case,” along with the addition of a new defendant based on social media posts containing religious ideas. This development prompts a direct constitutional question about differing judicial interpretations, which effectively transfer the application of the law to the executive authority through conditional and restrictive rulings on freedom of belief and expression—contrary to the absolute language of the Constitution and inconsistent with Egypt’s international commitments.
At the international level, Egypt is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18 guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the freedom to adopt any religion or belief. Article 19 guarantees freedom of expression, including the right to express opinions and ideas without interference. Within this framework, freedom of belief cannot be separated from the freedom to express it, so long as such expression does not involve incitement to violence or hatred.
Legal doctrine on this point is clear: criminalization applies to harmful acts, not to abstract ideas. The expression of a religious opinion—no matter how different—does not constitute a crime unless it is accompanied by incitement to violence or hatred. Otherwise, it remains within the realm of debate—and debate is the essence of any living society. As noted, the issue is not about a particular religion, but about the principle of freedom of belief.
According to data from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, this case is part of a broader pattern of prosecutions related to freedom of religious expression. More than 53 arrests were documented across eight cases during 2025 and 2026, with 43 individuals still in pretrial detention. These figures raise serious questions.
The established principle in legal doctrine distinguishes between “idea” and “act.” The law does not criminalize abstract thought, but rather conduct that results in material harm or direct incitement. Accordingly, evaluating such cases requires determining whether there is tangible harm or a threat to public order, or whether the matter falls within the scope of expressing a belief. The limits of criminalization are tied to actions, and the mere expression of religious ideas is not, in itself, a criminal act—is it?
As for how to deal with doctrinal differences, this approach must be reconsidered. Security or criminal measures are not the most effective tools for addressing ideas. Alternative mechanisms—such as public debate, religious discourse, and educational institutions—are better suited to managing intellectual diversity without legal escalation. This is what ultimately provides society with the stability it seeks.
In light of this, there is a clear need to recalibrate the relationship between constitutional texts and legal practice, in a way that ensures consistency with the principle of “absolute freedom of belief” and with international obligations. This also requires a more precise definition of the criteria for legal intervention, so that it remains limited to acts involving clear harm, without expanding the criminalization of the expression of beliefs.
In the end, the issue is not about endorsing or rejecting particular ideas, but about ensuring a legal framework that balances the protection of public order with the safeguarding of constitutional rights—foremost among them freedom of belief and expression. Protecting society does not mean imprisoning ideas; it means empowering society to confront them. Strong societies do not fear debate.
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