By Amb. Alberto M. Fernandez* – MEMRI-
In terms of sheer carnage, the bloodiest war going on right now would be Ukraine. In terms of media coverage, the most minutely covered and obsessed by Western elites would be Gaza. But a case can be made that the broadest war going on today is in the shadows, between the desert and the sown, ranging thousands of miles, across a dozen countries, from Western Africa to the Indian Ocean coast of East Africa. This is the war being waged by Jihadist groups, ethnic militias, and bandits, all Muslim but often drawn from specific tribes and ethnicities, against others – against African governments and their foreign allies, rival ethnic groups, and African Christians and animists.[1]
The scope of this war of imperial conquest, which is often seen as a series of separate regional or national conflicts, is massive.[2] If you were to draw a line from Bamako in Mali through the Democratic Republic of Congo to Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, the distance is close to 4,000 miles (6,500 kilometers). And even though the conflicts in Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique are all different in their local political, economic, ethnic, and military characteristics, there are some very general similarities. There is the struggle between pastoralists and farmers, between Muslims (not all of them Jihadists) and Christians, between different ethnicities, between those with economic power and those with political power, fighting over scarce resources.
Although Westerners tend to focus on things like the French being replaced by the Russians or the rising role of China, or great power competition, or resource extraction, or climate change, an essential part of this grand conflict is ancient, rooted in realities on the ground going back to the time of the Islamic conquest of North Africa in the eighth century. Western intervention – when it happens – tends to be clumsy and expensive, and often clothed in the specious language of humanitarianism.
We seem to see two patterns – either a heavy-handed presence (think the Americans in Somalia in 1993 or various French interventions) or a washing of hands in frustration that these conflicts seem intractable and unimportant to Western interests. Western governments are alarmed by the growth of Russia’s ramshackle informal empire in Africa[3] but seem still stuck in the old paradigm of the old liberal world order – imposing Western cultural and political values on Africa, and talking down to Africans. When Africans reject this, Westerners tend to throw up their hands and are tempted to walk away.
In 2025, the new Trump Administration has looked at the world with fresh eyes, an overdue change. Africa should be no exception to prioritizing America First interests. There is a role for the United States to play in Africa that should neither be the extreme poles of liberal nation building nor ignoring the region. An American role of some sort is important because it is entirely possible that in the near future, in countries and regions in Africa, Jihadists and/or chaos may triumph.[4] The terrorist leaders are hard and deadly men. Some, like Tuareg warlord Iyad Ag Ghali, are brilliant and ruthless survivors with dreams of empire.
Regimes in countries like Burkina Faso and Mali are increasingly fragile and their incipient fall into either Jihadism triumphant or chaos is not in America’s interest.[5] Burkina Faso’s worst terrorist attack was only last year, with over 600 civilians slaughtered.[6] Jihadists are seeking to move further south. The deadliest attack ever in Christian-majority Benin – a country south of Burkina Faso and Niger – by Al-Qaeda’s Sahel branch (JNIM) – took place only last week.[7]
What does this mean? This means that it is in the interest of the U.S., and of the West in general, for someone to win who can impose a certain type of order in these conflict-ridden states. It does not matter – should not matter to the US – if Russian-aligned African states propped up by Wagner or if some other player propped up by some other foreign power “win” against insurgents and can impose order.
Whether victory comes through Russian help or that of France or Turkey or the UAE is immaterial as long as a type of order can be maintained.[8] There are some more complicated situations. I think of Sudan, where both sides are similar (but not the same): Neither is anti-West and both have foreign support. But in all the other situations in Africa, where the state confronts Jihadists, we should want that state to win, even if they are allied with Moscow.
At the same time, Africa (especially Russia in Africa) should actually motivate us to think of American force projection in different ways.[9] American reform in the Defense and State Department (including the elimination of USAID) under Trump should lead to the development of a different type of expeditionary diplomacy – lighter, cheaper, more embedded, and agile. A security and diplomatic policy that is less Cadillac Escalade and more Ford pickup truck, less endless Global War on Terror and more working with others or through proxies to get inexpensive quick-fix solutions.
It is probably too much to expect that, for example, the U.S. would actively work with Russia to help Mali against its insurgents. But we do need to break away from the old ways of African foreign policy all-too-often heavily guided by the U.S. advocacy and humanitarian community. One positive early development in the Trump Administration is diminishing if not completely eliminating the existing, left-leaning NGO-industrial complex that functioned as a force multiplier for liberal interventionism. The challenge is going to be to replace that old system by something that is actually important to us. In Africa what is ultimately most useful to us is killing Jihadists, making sure they do not control large ungoverned spaces, and doing a better job in successfully competing for valuable resources.
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*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
[1] See MEMRI JTTM report ISIS In Africa (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Mozambique): Targeting Christians – Killing, Beheading, Murdering Priests And Nuns, Burning Churches, Health Clinics, And Homes – As The World Is Largely Silent, June 16, 2023.
[2] Ctc.westpoint.edu/aqims-imperial-playbook-understanding-al-qaida-in-the-islamic-maghrebs-expansion-into-west-africa, April 29, 2022.
[3] Lediplomate.media/2025/03/russie-afrique/olivierdauzon/monde/afrique, March 13, 2025.
[4] Igberetvnews.com/1482366/nigeria-police-unabated-terror-fulani-herdsmen-case-culpability-inevitability-nigerias-disintegration/#forward, April 2025.
[5] Studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/sahels-shifting-sands-how-security-landscape-redrawing-regional-alliances, March 27, 2025.
[6] Lefigaro.fr/international/une-attaque-lache-et-barbare-des-djihadistes-commettent-un-effroyable-massacre-au-burkina-faso-20240829, April 29, 2024.
[7] Apnews.com/article/benin-attack-soldiers-militants-405bf0d7954310c508ecc5dc7ef95c33, April 24, 2025.
[8] See MEMRI Daily Brief No. 600, Turkey’s Syrian Mercenaries Come To The Sahel In Africa, May 17, 2024.
[9] Zinebriboua.com/p/the-russian-art-of-unwar, March 21, 2025.
