By Michael Wahid Hanna – Foreign Affairs –
When War Broke Out in Gaza, Biden Reconciled With Sisi—but Trump’s Calculus Might Differ.
In May, after an Israeli military offensive prompted a shutdown of the Rafah border crossing from Egypt into southern Gaza, which had been the main route for humanitarian assistance into the Palestinian enclave, the Egyptian government refused to allow aid to pass through the Israeli-controlled crossing in nearby Kerem Shalom. Egypt understood Gazans’ desperation. But it was also intensely unhappy about the deployment of Israeli forces on its border, and blocking the redirection of aid through Kerem Shalom was one of the few tools it possessed to register its displeasure with the Israeli offensive.
Some U.S. officials expressed private worries that Egypt would dig in its heels indefinitely, and thus fundamentally imperil humanitarian aid operations in Gaza. Instead, however, after a telephone conversation with U.S. President Joe Biden, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi agreed to permit the flow of assistance from Egypt through Kerem Shalom as a temporary measure. Even four years ago, such a concession by Sisi to Biden would have been unthinkable. Yet the agreement was a reflection of a new rapport between the leaders, a turnabout that reflected a broadly improved bilateral partnership between the United States and Egypt on a host of pressing diplomatic matters.
Since Egypt’s realignment away from the Soviet sphere in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the country has been an anchor for U.S. regional policy and the recipient of extensive U.S. assistance. Over the past decade, however, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship has often been the focus of intense scrutiny and frustration. For a time, it was even possible to imagine a recalibration of the relationship that would take account of Sisi’s domestic repression and Egypt’s declining strategic importance in the Middle East. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Egypt effectively supported Donald Trump, and it may have gone so far as to illegally contribute to his campaign. By the time Biden took office in 2021, Cairo was fully prepared for a return of the bilateral tensions that marked the Obama era, when Egypt’s failed transition to democracy spurred a ferocious authoritarian resurgence that prompted the United States to reconsider the strategic logic of the countries’ relationship. That fear seemed to be confirmed in late 2021, when Biden’s secretary of state, Antony Blinken, blocked $130 million in military aid because of concerns aboutEgypt’s grim human rights record.
Yet the inertial power of long-standing security arrangements and the drift of events in the region have effectively foreclosed any serious reexamination of the fundamentals of U.S.-Egyptian ties. As regional tensions have soared, Egypt has emerged as a central player (alongside Qatar, which has been the host of Hamas’s political office) in the U.S.-led efforts to mediate a cease-fire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Cairo still sees itself as a leader among the Arab states, and its recent role in cease-fire diplomacy has made it a constant interlocutor for the United States. This new prominence is both a balm to Egypt’s self-image and a reversal of the lack of attention it received earlier in Biden’s tenure.
As the war in Gaza has given rise to fears of an all-out escalation in the Middle East, the United States and Egypt have been able to focus their interactions on regional security and diplomacy, where their interests are increasingly aligned. In the not-so-distant past, Egypt’s authoritarian turn caused many in Washington to argue against maintaining the close relationship. More recently, however, the need to contend with the spillover effects of the war in Gaza has led U.S. policymakers to leave behind their professed concerns for democracy and human rights. Instead, the United States has increasingly sought to maintain stable relationships with its traditional partners regardless of their governing record.
With Trump set to return to the White House in January, Egypt can feel reassured that concerns about democracy and human rights will not figure prominently in its interactions with the incoming administration. But it would be a mistake for the United States to simply reconcile itself to a new normal that takes Egypt’s ineffective economic model and political repression as a given. While that model and that repression have proved capable of sustaining Sisi in power, they have left Egypt vulnerable to future crises and have not addressed the needs of the country’s growing population.
PAST TENSIONS
The recent warming of U.S.-Egyptian ties marks a major shift from where the relationship stood even as recently as 2020. When Biden was running for president that year, he declared in no uncertain terms that there would be “no more blank checks” for Sisi, whom Trump had called his “favorite dictator.” In part, Biden wanted to contrast his commitment to democracy and human rights to Trump’s seeming affinity for autocratic rulers.
But Biden’s stance also reflected the baggage he carried from his stint as President Barack Obama’s vice president. Relations between the United States and Egypt reached a low point after the July 2013 “military coup” that paved the way for Sisi’s ascent to power. In October of that year, (..) the United States suspended the bulk of military assistance to Egypt. After much heated internal debate, the Obama administration reinstated military aid to Egypt in March 2015 but ended the practice of cash-flow financing, which had previously allowed Egypt to purchase military equipment on credit. The administration also placed limits on how Egypt could use the aid it received.
Despite the resumption of aid, the U.S-Egyptian relationship came to be characterized by intense suspicion and friction. Instead of anchoring U.S. policy in the Middle East, Egypt was seen as a problem to be managed. The United States was particularly concerned about the country’s authoritarian course, which continued in steadfast fashion notwithstanding halfhearted attempts by Washington to use its military aid as a check on Sisi’s government.
As I argued in Foreign Affairs in 2015, relations between the two countries appeared to lack any real strategic mooring. The strains seemed to offer an opportunity for the United States to modernize and right-size its partnership with Egypt. But restructuring ties in this fashion would have set off a major bureaucratic battle within the U.S. government. And such a restructuring, if successful, might have entailed some risks, since the relationship with Egypt has been a central pillar of U.S. regional policy ever since President Anwar al-Sadat chose to move his country out of the Soviet orbit in the 1970s.
For its part, Egypt was apparently so dissatisfied with the Obama administration that it may have engaged in a risky gambit to influence the 2016 election and keep another Democratic president out of office. In August of this year, The Washington Post disclosed that U.S. intelligence agencies believed that Sisi had sought to donate $10 million to Trump for his 2016 presidential campaign. A mysterious transfer from the state-run National Bank of Egypt fueled a 2019 Justice Department probe into whether Egypt illegally supported Trump’s campaign. According to the Post, however, that investigation was shut down by Trump’s attorney general, William Barr. (A spokesperson for Trump’s presidential campaign denied the allegation.)
A SURPRISING THAW
Following Trump’s election defeat in 2020, Egyptian officials worried about what the new Biden administration might mean for the bilateral relationship. Their concern initially appeared justified. Biden’s skepticism toward Egypt was demonstrated by his avoidance of a traditional first call with Sisi after his election. (By contrast, the Egyptian president was the first foreign leader to speak with Trump after his election victory in November 2016.) In late May 2021, however, a crisis in Gaza forced Biden’s hand. The United States and Egypt worked together to help negotiate a cease-fire, and that instance of successful cooperation eased some of the strain between the two leaders.
Throughout the current war in Gaza, the Biden administration has once again relied on Egypt in its diplomatic efforts to secure a cease-fire. The United States publicly endorsed Egypt’s opposition to any forced displacement of Palestinians into the Sinai Peninsula. The administration has also backed Egypt’s position that Israel should withdraw from the narrow strip of land between Egypt and Gaza known as the Philadelphi corridor or the Salah al-Din axis, which Israel occupied as part of its offensive into Rafah. In an effort to prevent a permanent Israeli reoccupation of the area in and around Rafah, American officials have been explicit about the need to reopen the border crossing.
The eventual reopening of the crossing will necessarily be tied to governance reforms in Gaza. And even though the United States and Egypt have been working in parallel to establish a Palestinian counterpart to staff the Gaza side of the checkpoint, the prospects for an agreement about governance have dimmed considerably as the cease-fire talks have foundered. In addition, some of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent comments have intensified doubts in Cairo about Washington’s ability to influence a negotiated outcome.
Washington’s recommitment to an authoritarian order in Egypt carries risks.
Nevertheless, Egyptian officials have taken some comfort from the Biden administration’s positions and its willingness to engage. As an Egyptian diplomat recently told me, “We are obviously frustrated by Gaza, but we also appreciate the extent of cooperation at the moment and the predictability of our interactions.”Similarly, American officials have been happily surprised by Egypt’s willingness to at least discuss a role in guaranteeing Gaza’s postwar security. Traditionally, Egypt has been loath to get enmeshed in Gazan affairs. Lately, however, diplomatic discussions have raised the possibility of deploying an international force in which Egypt might participate.
The recent U.S.-Egyptian alignment extends to issues beyond Gaza. Sometimes this rapprochement has taken the form of an easing of previous obstacles. On the subject of Libya, for example, where the United States has long worried about Egypt’s support for Libyan authorities in the east of the country, one U.S. official told methat “Egypt is no longer seen by the administration as unhelpful.” Other times, the coordination between the two countries has a more positive shape. American officials have noted that Egypt has been surprisingly helpful to the United States in its quest to marshal international support for Ukraine, even if Egypt is reluctant to acknowledge it publicly.
Perhaps the clearest example of the new working relationship concerns Sudan. Previously, the United States viewed Egypt’s attitude to its southern neighbor with deep suspicion. U.S. officials suspected that Cairo gave tacit approval for the October 2021 coup launched by Sudan’s military leaders that ousted the country’s transitional civilian leadership. American wariness of Egyptian intentions colored Washington’s diplomatic efforts when civil war broke out in Sudan: the initial American approach was premised on the idea that Egypt was inextricably tied to the Sudanese armed forces and thus constituted an obstacle to peacemaking.
More recently, however, the United States has shifted gears. Cairo has become a key partner in Washington’s still unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a cease-fire in Sudan. Small concessions, such as the opening of border crossings with Chad for humanitarian assistance, have depended on Egyptian efforts to influence the Sudanese military. The United States has also taken note of Egypt’s restraint in supporting the Sudanese army. And American and Egyptian views have lately converged on the necessity of protecting Sudan’s institutions and preserving its territorial integrity.
SURMOUNTABLE CHALLENGES
While much of the distrust and anxiety that characterized the U.S.-Egyptian relationship a decade ago has faded, some irritants remain. Foremost is the United States’ annual decision on extending military financing to Egypt. For decades, Egypt has been the second-largest recipient of U.S. military aid, after Israel.Currently, Congress appropriates around $1.3 billion of assistance for Egypt on a yearly basis, but some of that funding is conditioned on the fulfillment of human-rights requirements. In September 2021, Blinken’s refusal to waive those requirements—which caused $130 million in military aid to be withheld—was seen as a potential indication of its seriousness about human rights and its intention to break with the Trump administration’s leniency.
That decision provoked disquiet in Egypt. As its relationship with Washington has improved, however, Cairo has taken a more muted approach to the annual review. It has also seen benefits from its cooperation with the administration on Gaza. In September, for the first time, Blinken waived some of the human-rights requirements and certified compliance with others, which allowed Egypt to receive the entire tranche of U.S. aid. The decision signaled the end of the pretense that military aid afforded the United States meaningful leverage on democracy and human rights. Yet it also encouraged the resumption of a strategic dialogue with Cairo, which furthered the sense of improving relations beyond the realm of cease-fire diplomacy.
Another thorn pricked the relationship this year when Senator Bob Menendez, the New Jersey Democrat and powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was convicted on charges of receiving bribes from businessmen working on behalf of Egypt and Qatar. (Menendez subsequently resigned from the Senate.) The public scrutiny fed the perception that Egypt was all too willing to intercede in U.S. politics and led to some embarrassment in Cairo.
So far, however, these challenges have not soured the positive atmosphere between the two countries. Egypt has deftly turned its vulnerabilities to its advantage, most notably by translating international concern about a broadening regional war into much-needed economic assistance. But even though crises and conflicts have reordered the United States’ immediate regional priorities, Washington should not forget that major internal problems continue to befuddle Egypt.
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
The deficiencies in Egypt’s governing vision have stunted its ability to play a significant regional role. In many cases, this has led Egypt’s chief diplomatic partners to focus primarily on avoiding worst-case scenarios. Although this status quo has allowed Egypt some flexibility with respect to its key partners (including the United States), it is hardly the basis for a self-sustained and prosperous future in which the country is able to shoulder its historical role as a leader in the Arab world. Egypt’s long-term stability will depend on credibly addressing its economic and political challenges, and it would be a mistake for the United States to reconcile itself to Egypt’s faltering economic approach and entrenched autocracy.
It is unrealistic to imagine that U.S.-Egyptian relations can be significantly restructured amid the region’s upheaval. The U.S. government’s attention is stretched thin, and Egypt plays a critical part in its efforts to manage the conflict in Gaza. But Washington’s recommitment to an authoritarian order in Egypt at a time of growing regional instability carries its own longer-term risks. While Egypt is not on the cusp of a replay of the popular uprisings that brought down the Mubarak regime in 2011, its economic and political weaknesses will certainly undermine governance and may eventually threaten its stability. The Egyptian economy remains fragile, and Cairo has yet to offer a sustainable model of development that can keep pace with the needs of Egyptian society. What is more, Cairo’s insular approach to governance has created blind spots for Egypt’s leaders. The country’s decision-makers have been walled off from necessary public criticism and debate, and they have narrowed the space for internal dialogue within the government. As a result, they have been unable to respond effectively to the concerns of the private sector, civil society, and elements of the bureaucracy.
Ahead of the November 2024 U.S. presidential election, Egypt did not demonstrate a preference for either candidate. Now that Trump has won, however, bilateral ties face a somewhat uncertain future. Trump will likely reprise the rhetorical embrace of Egypt that marked his first term, along with a lack of concern for democracy and human rights. But his probable endorsement of Israel’s maximalist agenda will necessarily mean that the current centerpiece of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, cease-fire diplomacy, will lose its salience. In the near term, Egypt will therefore be unlikely to face significant friction with the Trump administration, but it is also unlikely to feature prominently in Trump’s foreign policy.
Nevertheless, although Trump will probably not push for major policy recalibrations, his administration should press Cairo to enact the sort of political and economic reforms that will be essential for its longer-term stability. Injections of new funding from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, along with major new investments from the United Arab Emirates, have helped stabilize the economy for the moment. Further stability could be achieved by convincing Egypt to denationalize its state-owned—particularly military-owned—firms, which pose a major hurdle for the private sector. On the political front, some form of course correction remains a necessity. Allowing independent political activity and releasing political prisoners will foster significant goodwill among the Egyptian public and external partners such as the United States and Europe. Most important, however, these steps would help Egypt bolster its capacity to deal with the ongoing crisis in Gaza and with the challenges to come.
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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/egypt/does-america-still-need-egypt
MICHAEL WAHID HANNA is U.S. Program Director at the International Crisis Group and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Reiss Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law.
