by Ishak Ibrahim – Al-Manassa-
The bombing of St. Elias Church in Damascus last month has reignited deep fears—not only for the future of Syria’s Christians but for the very existence and role of Christians across the Middle East. Waves of persecution seem never to truly subside before exploding again. The massacre at St. Elias, which left around 25 people martyred, was neither the first of its kind nor particularly different in method from attacks previously witnessed in Iraq and Egypt.
While instability, war, crisis, and the absence of a shared understanding of citizenship affect everyone, they are especially harsh on religious minorities—Christians among them. Such conditions not only decrease their numbers but also steadily erode their role in public life, deepening a collective sense of despair about the future and the possibility of change.
The Shar’ Regime Fails the Test
Over the past two decades, the situation of religious minorities in the region has been a constant point of concern amid the political unrest sweeping across most countries, as regimes fail to address attacks and discrimination.
In Syria, minorities have been easy targets for both state and non-state actors throughout the civil war—ranging from the Assad regime, to Salafi jihadists, to opposition forces and Turkish-backed militias. These targeted attacks often stem from religious and political motives.
When the Assad regime fell in December and control passed to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its allies, two narratives emerged:
The first was optimistic about the success of the revolution, the end of the civil war, and the closing of the bloodstained chapter of the Baath Party. It carried broad hopes that the new regime would begin repairing the torn fabric of Syria, bridging the divides among its components, and learning from the failed experiences of other countries in the region — which either led to civil wars, as in Libya and Sudan, or the return of the old regime in an even more authoritarian form, as in Egypt.
The other was cautious, fearful of repeating the catastrophic failures of past Islamist regimes, often defined by incompetence, ideological rigidity, and loyalty to the movement over the nation.
Unfortunately, events have confirmed the latter pessimistic view. The regime of Ahmad al-Shar’ has proven incapable of steering a peaceful transition. Instead, massacres against minorities in Syria have surged.
These atrocities began with retaliatory violence against the Alawites (the sect of the Assad family), then evolved into daily campaigns by jihadist factions to assert total domination over Syria’s future. Civilian populations in the west and south faced widespread sectarian attacks by those loyal to the transitional government—now under the core influence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
A recent report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, titled “Religious Freedom and U.S. Policy in Post-Assad Syria,” reveals the nature and frequency of these violations. Among the most prominent are the harassment of Christians and attempts to impose practices that restrict their freedoms and compel them to conform to what Islamist jihadist groups deem acceptable — such as forcing women to wear the hijab or destroying crosses on churches. In addition, there have been cases of kidnapping, deliberate arson, and retaliatory killings targeting Alawites.
By March, the killings had escalated into full-fledged sectarian massacres of Alawites in Latakia and Tartous. Estimates suggest between 1,700 and 2,246 confirmed dead, with far higher unofficial numbers. In May, violence shifted toward the Druze communities near Damascus, resulting in at least 137 deaths.
A Pattern Repeats
The current ruling authority in Syria is following the same general approach as religious-based regimes. It shares common features with what occurred in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and in Egypt during and after the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood. In both cases, the political leadership sought to court the West and promote itself as a protector of religious minorities, claiming it would work to integrate them and guarantee their rights — but without taking any concrete steps on the ground.
At the same time, the dominant group forges alliances with even more extreme factions in order to accelerate its grip on the levers of state power and institutions. Like the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt), the Shar’ regime has placed its loyalists—many of whom have a record of violence and rhetoric steeped in extremism and hatred—into senior positions of authority. This ideological alliance typically results in concessions that come at the expense of minorities and their rights.
In such a climate, attacks adopt the most brutal tactics reminiscent of ISIS: bombing packed churches, gunning down peaceful gatherings in cold blood, and deliberately sending messages of terror to all minorities—religious or ethnic.
Each time, authorities and supporters label the incidents as isolated, insisting they aren’t directed at specific communities—yet do little to prevent future ones or confront the justifications used to incite them.
The Identity Question
The region’s recent history is a string of failures—particularly in answering the most fundamental question: What kind of state do we want? And who is it for? Religious-based governments have failed to resolve this, defaulting to majoritarianism.
Because the majority population is Muslim—and these ruling movements are socially and culturally conservative—they rush to Islamize the state and society, often allying with more radical Salafi or jihadist factions.
In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood’s hunger for unchecked control and for embedding religion into state institutions contributed to its collapse.
It appears that the Shar’ regime is following the same path, despite the fact that Syria’s demographic composition is far more complex—marked by religious and ethnic diversity and a history of long, bloody conflicts among its various communities. These are factors that ought to compel the transitional authorities to proceed with great caution. The pressing question, then, is: Will the Syria of the future be a state driven solely by an Islamic orientation? An Islamic theocracy? Or a Sunni state exclusively for Sunnis?
Equal Citizenship or Modern-Day Dhimmitude?
These concerns link directly to another core issue: Are minorities full and equal citizens, or second-class subjects? Is Syria heading toward modernized dhimmitude, where some groups are fully protected and enjoy all rights, while others are restricted under terms set by the dominant religion?
For example, Iraq introduced a system of governance, institutions, and legislation rooted in religious discrimination. The state has entrenched a status resembling dhimmitude for Iraqi Christians and other non-Muslim religious communities, including Yazidis, Mandaeans, and others. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood exercised all forms of domination and exclusion in order to impose a religious constitution, without any regard for the objections of those who opposed it—chief among them the Christian community.
Justified Fears
At the funeral for the victims of St. Elias, Patriarch John X openly criticized the Shar’ regime’s response: No officials visited the church, except the lone Christian minister, and victims were not honored as martyrs—unlike Muslim victims in similar incidents. He also lamented that mere condolence call is not enough.
He reaffirmed that Christians are an integral part, and fundamental component, of Syria, and will stay there despite these sad events. He remains hopeful that the government will uphold the revolution’s ideals: democracy, freedom, equality, and rule of law. He addressed Shar’ directly: “We reached out to build a new Syria. Sadly, we are still waiting for your hand to reach back.”
Just as real security requires more than stationing a guard outside a church, true coexistence needs more than speeches. It demands: Inclusive policies, recognition of cultural rights, and a commitment to citizenship that embraces diversity.
Conclusion: A Dangerous Pattern
What’s happening in Syria—and what may spread to neighboring countries—is a tragic pattern: Minorities are sacrificed as scapegoats for regimes that fail to build modern, inclusive states grounded in equality, justice, participation in all affairs of the state, and citizenship for all.
There is, of course, no instant cure for deeply rooted crises. There is, however, a pressing need for concrete action, offering minorities and all citizens positive messages and hope that their suffering is not in vain—that their homelands are worth rebuilding on solid foundations of dignity and shared future.
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